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574 PUCOETT~ v. GmOLA [20C, (2d) 
this action has brought himself within the terms of section 
708 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entitling him to the re-
lief therein provided. This question is not before us in the 
present instance and cannot. properly be determined until 
the defendants have had an opportunity to put in such de-
fense as they may have to the motion of plaintiff to have 
said judgment revived. 
It follows that the order denying the motion of the de-
fendants to vacate the order of June 9, 1938, was erroneous 
and should be reversed, and it is so ordered. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Tray-
nor, J., concurred. 
[So F. No. 16711. In Bank. JUly 16, 1942.J 
ALBERTO PUCCETTI, Plaintiff ; GEMMA PUCCETTI, as 
Administratrix, etc. (Substituted Plaintiff), Appellant, 
v. MADELINE GIROLA et al., Respondents. 
[lJ Deeds - Grantors - Designation on Ohange of Name. _ Non-
compliance with Civ. Code, § 1096, requiring a grantor who 
has changed his name to set forth the name in which he 
derived title, renders the deed void, even as to a subsequent 
purchaser who had notice of the change in name. 
[2J Executions-Right of Purchasers-Bona Fide Purchasers_ 
Notice. - Notwithstanding the invalidity of a deed, if the 
grantee paid value for the conveyance, he has an equity in 
the land that takes priority over the rights of a subsequent 
purchaser at an execution sale with notice of his interest. 
[3J Fraudulent Oonveyances-Evidence-Oonsideration._A find-
ing that certain deeds were not entirely voluntary is without 
SUpport in the evidence where it appears that the purported 
consideration therefor was the cancellation by the grantee 
of gratuitous assignments of accounts previously marked 
"closed" presumably because valueless, or where, if the ac.-
[2J See 11 Oal. Jur. 123; 21 Am. Jur. 156. 
[3, 4] See 6A Oal. Jur. 80. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Deeds, § 13; [2] Executions, § 101; 
[3] Fraudulent Conveyances, § 107; [4J Corporations, § 6; 
[5J Vendor and Purchaser, § 369 (5). 
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counts be regarded as subsisting, the result is that the con-
sideration was furnished by the grantor. 
[4] Oorporations-Disregard of Oorporate Entity-When Proper. 
-The consequences that ordinarily follow the observance of 
the separate identity of a. corporation .andthe persons who 
compose it are disregarded when it is necessary to protect 
the rights of third persons or to prevent injustice. The rule 
is applicable where members of a family are directors of a 
corporation, where they recl;live salaries from a subsidiarycor~ 
poration which they deposit in. bank accounts of the cor-
poration and which, aside from amounts drawn out in cash! 
are expended for household expenses, and where pending an 
action arising out of a fraudulent sale of stock in a subsid-
iary a quitclaim deed is executed by tli'tj corporation to the 
mother, the purported consideration being the cancell!1tion of 
gratuitous assignments of amounts owing from the corpora-
tion to the children, the assignors. 
[5] Vendor-Bona Fide Purchasers-Mortgagee.-A mortgagee 
. acquires no security when the mortgagor is without title by 
reason of the fact that the deed to him did not comply with 
Civ. Code, § 1096, relating to deeds by grantors who have 
changed their names. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County. Warren V. Tryon, JUdge.assigned. Reversed. 
Action to quiet title. Judgment for defendants and for 
cross-complainant reversed. 
Jesse G. Benson for Appellant. 
John J. Beck, Altman & Ellis, JohnC. Altman andWn. 
lard L. Ellis, Donahue, Richards & Hamlin and A.R. Rowell 
for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On April 21, 1931, Alberto Puccetti com-
menced an action against Girola Bros., a corporation, Henry 
Girola, its president and sole stockholder, and others for 
fraudulently inducing him to purchase stock in a subsidiary 
corporation. Before that suit was filed, Girola Bros. had 
changed its name to Madalay, Inc., and while the . action was . 
pending, it conveyed by quitclaim deeds certain real prop-
erty to defendant Madeline Girola, a director of Girola Bros. 
and the mother of Henry Girola. The deeds, recorded by 
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failed to set forth the name in which Madalay Inc. derived 
title to the realty as required by section 1096 of the Civil 
Code. On November 1, 1933, ,Puccetti obtained a judgment, 
and on JUly 9, 1937, recorded an abstract thereof and a writ 
of execution levying upon all the right, title, and interest 
of the judgment dcbtors in the property. On August 18, 
1937, Madeline Girola executed a mortgage on the property 
to defendant State Finance Company which recorded it on 
October 8, 1937. On November 8, 1937, Puccetti purchased 
the land at an execution sale and on that day recorded the 
sheriff's certificate of salc. On December 9,1938, he recorded the 
sheriff's deed conveying the property to him. He then 
brought this action to quiet title to the land, claiming that 
the conveyance to Madeline Girola was void because it failed 
to comply with section 1096 of the Civil Code and because 
it was in fraud of creditors. 
The trial court made findings in favor of defendants and 
granted the cross-complaint of Madeline Girola, quieting title 
in her. Puccetti has appealed from the judgment. Follow-
ing his death during the pendency of the appeal, his ad:rw.n-
istratrix, Gemma Puccetti, was substituted as plaintiff and 
appellant. 
[1J It is admitted that the conveyance from Madalay Inc. 
to Madeline Girola failed to comply with section 1096 of tne 
Civil Code, providing "Any person in whom the title of rflal 
estate is vested, who shall afterwards, from any cause, have 
his or her name changed, must in any conveyance of said rflal 
estate so held, set forth the name in which he or she derived 
title to said real estate." Appellant contends that the .J.'e-
quirements of this section are mandatory and that a deed in 
Violation thereof does not pass legal title. Respondents argue 
that the section must be construed to have the same effect as 
the recording statutes embodied in sections 1213-1218 of tine 
Oivil Code, so that a conveyance in disregard thereof can be 
attacked only by a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer 
for value without notice of the change of name by the orig-
inal owner. 
Section 1096 was originally enacted in 1874 following a 
.suggestion of the court in Fallon v. Kehoe, 38 Cal. 44 [99 
Am. Dec. 347J. In that case, land had been conveyed to 
Jeremiah l<'allon ill his nickname, Darby 0 'Fallon. He con-
veyed the land in his true name before the enactment of the 
recording act, and following its enactment he made another 
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conveyance in the name under which he had derived title. 
In a suit between the successive grantees, 'the court held that 
the first grantee was entitled to prevail under the common 
law rule that whatever the name in which the true owner 
conveyed the property, the conveyances as between grantor 
and grantee transferred the title. Recordation of the first 
deed was held to be constructive notice to subsequent pur-
chasers even though a search of the record would not have 
disclosed the earlier deed, which was out of the grantor's 
chain of title. ' 
Section 1096 seeks to prev~nt any opportunity for fraud 
in comparable situations by requiring a grantor who conveys 
land by a name other than that in which he derived title 
to recite the change of name in the conveyance. It thus abro-
gates the common-law rule relied upon in t~Fallon case 
by precluding any conveyance that would appear in the 
record as a "wild deed" from. giving rise to multiple chains 
of title. Its language is mandatory and nowhere suggests 
that compliance is excused when a subsequent purchaser 
has notice of the change in name. It was placed' in the chap-
ter entitled "Transfers of Real Property' i and grouped with 
4~ other sections under the heading "Mode of Transfer. i, Sec-
tion 1095 in the same chapter provides in similar language 
that "When an attorney in fact executes an. instrument 
transferring an estate in real property, he must subscribe 
the name of the principal to it, and his Own name as attorney 
in fact," and it has been held that failure to follow the man~ 
date of that section renders a deed void. (Morrison v. Bow-' 
man, 29 Cal. 337; Mitchell v. Benjamin Franklin Bonding 
& Indemnity Corp., 13 Cal. App. (2d) 447 [57 P. (2d) 185].) 
The deeds from Madalay, 1M. to Madeline Girola were 
therefore inoperative to pass legal title;' and title remained 
in the grantor corporation in the absence of a reforma-
tion of the deeds to comply with CiVil dode section 
1096 or of an adjUdication of the identity of the grantor 
under' section 751(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
The property was thus subject to Puccetti's levy of 
execution and passed to him by Virtue' of the sheriff's 
sale and deed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 700; Freelon v. A.drian, 
161 Cal. 13 .. 18 [118 Pac. 220J.) [2] Had Madeline Girola 
paid value for the conveyance, she would have an equity in 
the land that would take priority over the rights of a subse-
so O. (2dl-1l 
'Ii, ' i 
'I 
II 
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quent purchaser at an execution sale with notice of her in-
terest. (Whitney v. Sherman, 178 Cal. 435 [173 Pac. 931]; 
Riley v. Martinelli, 97 Cal. 575 [32 Pac. 579, 33 Am. St. Rep. 
209, 21 L. R. A. 33]. Sec, also, caSes cited in 11 Cal. Jur., 
p. 123.) [3, 4] 'rhe trial court's finding, however, that the 
deeds to Madeline Girola were not entirely voluntary is with-
out support in the evidence, which presents no confllct. Both 
Madeline Girola, the grantee, and ,Josephine Girola, secretary 
of the grantor corporation, testified that no money was paid 
and no property transferred by the £rr:llltce in consideration 
of the conveyance. The claimed consideration was alleged to 
have arisen from the following' transaction: Henry, Joseph, 
and Josephine Girola, who were all members of the Girola 
family and directors of Girola Bros., received salaries from 
a subsidiary corporation, which they deposited in the bank 
acconnts of Girola Bros. A large part of this money they 
drew out in cash, and another part of the money was ex-
pended by the corporation for the household expenses of 
members of the family. The books of the corporation' showed 
that it owed them, at one time, a total of $54,523.46. All 
these accounts, however, were marked as closed on January 
1, 1932. On April 28, 1932, the parties met in the office of 
their lawyer, where Henry, J oscph, and Josephine Girola 
executed gratuitous assignments to their mother, Madeline 
Girola, of the amounts that the books sho,Yed the corpora-
tion owed them. Madeline Girola immedintely" executed a 
canceilation in favor of Madalay, Inc. of thc amounts r:o 
assigned and received a conveynnce of the property. Since 
the accounts assigned to Madeline Oirola were marked 
closed several months before the purported assignments they 
were presumably valueless, and their cancellation would not 
constitute consideration for the deeds. Mort~over, even if 
these accounts had been SUbsisting the cOlLSideration would 
have been furnished in substance and effect by the grantor. 
The consequences that ordinarily follow the observance of 
the separate identity of a corporation and the persons who 
compose it are disregarded when it is necessary to protect 
the rights of third persons or to prevent injustice. (D. N. &; E. 
Walter &; Co. v. Zuckerman, 214: Cal. 418 [6 P. (2d) 251, 
79 A. L. R. 329] ; Wenban Estate, Inc. v. Hewlett, 193 Cal 
675 [227 Pac. 723] ; Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481 [202 Pac. 
673]. See, also, cases cited in 6A Cal. JUl'. 80.) The presence 
of a colorable consideration does not alter the nature of the 
July 1942] LYONS V. BRUNSWICK-BALKE ETC. CO. 579 
transaction or the fact that Madeline Girola failed to give 
value for the deeds. • 
[5] The parties stipulated that a lien asserted by the de-
i."-
fendant Bank of America National Trust and Savings Asso-
ciation and arising from a deed of trust executed by Girola 
Bros. before the transactions involved herein is a good' and 
subsisting licn and that it will remain so regardless of the 
outcome of this action. Defendant State Finance Company 
also asserts a lien by virtue of a mortgage executed by Made-
line Girola after the alleged conveyance to her by Madalay, 
Inc. Since Madeline Girola acquired no interest in the prop-
erty, however, the finance company acquired no security for 
its mortgage. (Tr01tf v. Taylor, 220 Cal. 652 [32 P. (2d) 
968] ; Promis v. Dnkc, 208 Cal. 420 [281 Pac. 613] ; Gould 
v. Wise, 97 Cal. 532 [32 Pac. 576, 33 Pac. 323].) The finance 
company dealt with :Madeline Girola at its own risk except 
for the protection offered by the record, and a search wonId 
have revealed no predecessor in interest of record to Made-
line Girola's grantor, an omission that would put a prri<aent . . ( 
person on lllqUlry. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Car-
ter, J., concurred. 
Respondent Girola's petition for a rehearing was denied 
August 10, 1942. 
[L. A. No. 18265. In Bank. July 16, 1942.] 
M. L. LYONS et al., ",1.ppeUants, v. THE BRUNSWICK-
BALKE-COLLENDER COMPANY (a Corporation) et 
al., Respondents. 
[la, Ib] Venue - Change of Venue - Waiver. - The right to a 
ehange of pbee of trial to t.he county of a defendant's resi-
dence is not waived where, when a codefendant demanded a 
transfer to n county adjoining that in which the defendant 
resided, he filed a consent to such chanr,c, and where within 
a week following the dismissal of the nction as to the code-
McK. Dig. References: [1] Venue, § 35; [2] Venue, § 28; 
[3] Waiver, § 11. 
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